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A N EW N UCLEAR THREAT: THE T ENTH CIRCUIT'S 
SHOCKING MISINTERPRETATION OF PREEMPTION 




N uc lear power will be th e key to Am e rica ' s energy future. Whi le we still li ve in the wake of Sov ie t-era nuclear ste reotypes, the horror of C hernobyl, and face 
dil emmas on where to store the waste, nuc lear energy is the saf-
est, c leanest, and most reli ab le source. 1 A nuclear energy fac ility 
can produce energy at a ninety-one percent effic iency ra te , 24/7, 
w ith zero carbon emissions. Additi ona ll y, nuclear plants run on 
uranium- an e lement so energy-rich that a single fuel pe ll e t the 
s ize of a fi ngertip conta ins as much energy as 17,000 cubi c feet 
of natural gas, 149 ga llons of oi l, o r one ton of coa l- saving 
the United States nearl y twe lve billi on dollars a yea r in energy 
costs. 2 Thus, the federal government mainta ins a strong interest 
in propping up the nuclear industry, despite the sti gmas about 
nuc lear waste. 3 
The Rocky F lats Plant is a nuclear weapons production fac il -
ity located just sixteen miles from the densely populated c ity of 
D enver.4 Dow Chemi ca l first opera ted the plant under a contract 
w ith the federal government, and then Rockwe ll international 
Corporatio n acquired the contract. 5 However, plant operations 
ha lted in 1989 w hen the Federa l Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
ra ided the fac ility and unea rthed ind ications of environmenta l 
c rimes. 6 Pla nt wo rkers mi shandl ed radioactive waste and the 
community theo ri zed that some of the waste had been poured 
into the ground , re leased into the a ir, and permeated the so il 
througho ut the a rea. 7 As thi s news emerged, the plant 's ne igh-
bors saw the ir prope rty va lues plummet. 8 Consequently, in 1990, 
the property owners fil ed a c lass action suit under Colorado state 
tort law and the federally ma ndated Price-Anderson Act (PAA or 
"the Act"), a lleg ing that the operato rs of the nuclear plant neg-
1 igentl y mishandled h igh-threat radi oacti ve and nuclear materi -
a ls.9 T he dua l autho rity actio n proceeded in hopes of recovering 
fo r damages caused by releases of plutonium and other haza rd -
o us substances. 1 o 
The PAA, w hich was enacted in 1957 to p romote the growth 
and innovation of nuc lear ente rprises, currently serves as insur-
ance coverage to nuc lear power plants in the event of an inc ident 
or acc ident. 11 T he Act is des igned to protect the nuclea r industry 
aga ins t liability c la ims a ri s ing fro m nuclear incidents w hil e 
sti 11 ensuring compensatio n coverage fo r the genera l pub I ic .12 
To promote the investment of nuc lear energy p lants g iven the 
nex us of low liab ili ty and like lihood for risk, the Act establishes 
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a no-fault insurance-type system, in which the fi rst 12.6 billion 
of payout is industry-fu nded.13 
However, after twenty-fi ve years of litigation, the United 
States Court of Appea ls fo r the Tenth C ircuit ultimate ly held 
that the plaintiffs in the Rocky Flats case did not meet the cri-
teri a to bring the ir sui t under the PAA, and that they had to rely 
so le ly on Col orado state tort law and assert a nui sance c la im.14 
Th e co urt he ld that pl a inti ffs a lleg ing inju ry fro m " lesse r 
nu c lear occurre nces"- that is, injuri es fa iling to meet the 
PAA's threshold of bod ily injury or property damage- could 
recover damages under state tort law. 15 This resul ted in more 
than $ 1 billion j udgment fo r a group of pl ainti ffs whose injury 
was characte ri zed as a " lesse r nuc lear occurrence ." 16 The 
characterization as a " lesse r nuc lear occurrence" meant that 
the damage at the Rocky Fl ats Plant did not constitute enough 
harm to tri gger the PAA compensation scheme; as a nuclear 
incident, the plant was persona lly liable ." 17 
Despite how dange rous to the industry that fi g ure may 
seem, the lasting consequences of the decis ion could be even 
graver. For instance, the Tenth C ircuit 's dec ision prov ides the 
pla intiffs with an option to c ircum vent the PAA's entire nuclear 
liabil ity reg ime. 18 The dec is ion a ll ows a pla inti ff to fi le a c la im, 
regardless of the degree of nu clea r harm and elevated PAA 
criteri a , which could result in a j udgement aga inst the nuclear 
plant and effecti ve ly end the energy innovation taking place .19 
Citizens injured in some way by a nuclear pl ant deserve com-
pensati on and justi ce . Yet, in s iding w ith the pla inti ffs, the 
Tenth C ircuit overturned the PAA's vig ilantly crafted equ ilib-
rium of protecting the pub lic from harm created by radioacti ve 
material , while defy in g the comprehens ive nuclea r li ability 
reg ime fo r owners and operators of nuc lear fac iliti es. 20 Thi s 
result creates an incenti ve fo r defendants of nuclea r to rt ac ti ons 
to a llow Pri ce-A nderso n judgments again st them, whi ch is 
like ly prefera ble to the liti gati on of a state tort claim .2 1 While 
the Tenth C ircui t's mi s in te rpretation of the " nuclear inc ident" 
at Rocky Fl ats resul ted in a damages amount that exceeded the 
compensation intenti onally a ll ocated fo r thi s type of event by 
Congress, it a lso contradi cted inth Circ uit and Fi fth Ci rcui t. 22 
Consequent ly, the dec ision w ill negati ve ly impact innovation 
*J.D. Cand idate, Washington College o f Law 20 19 
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in an industry critical to essentia l human services such as 
energy, power, and national security.23 
The Tenth Circui t's decis ion renders nuclear market par-
ticipants susceptib le to a new and undefined li abil ity. Th is 
uncertainty has a cascade of negative consequences. First, such 
uncertainty threatens to destabilize and weaken the value of the 
PAA's compensation system by disrupting the settled expecta-
tions of participants and investors in the nuclear market. 24 
Second, it discourages added participation and investment in 
nuclear energy within the United States .2s Further, it threatens 
to make the United States an outlier among countries with com-
mercial nuclear energy programs, many of wh ich are governed 
by international nuclear li abi lity conventions predicated on 
the principles inherent in the PAA.26 Aside from the political 
and industrial consequences stemming from Cook v. Rockwell 
International Corp. ,27 the decision may ultimately allow the 
court to regulate the industry as a means to modify an industry 
that is rapid ly modernizing, effectively amending the definition 
of a "nuclear incident" within the PAA.28 
Th is Article analyzes the preemption concerns raised by the 
Tenth Circu it decision in Cook v. Rockwell International Corp. , 
and the sweeping outcomes for the nuclear energy industry. Part 
II provides background in formation on the PAA, the federal law 
that preempts the Tenth Circuit decision, and compares the pre-
emption doctrine in similar energy contexts. 29 Part III analyzes 
the extensive impacts that the Tenth Circuit's preemption misin-
terpretation, and current posture of the law from this decision , 
poses for nuclear energy compan ies, the power industries, and 
judicial review.30 Part Ill also acknowledges that whi le this was 
a bad judgment with negative repercussions for the legal and 
nuclear communities, the definition ofa "nuclear incident" in the 
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) shou ld conform to the related defini-
tion of "n uclear damage" in the Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation for Nuc lear Damage.3 1 This will ensure that the 
lega l framework from the Cook decision has a limited impact 
and is better defined going forward. 32 Commun ities should 
receive monetary compensation for injuries permeating out of 
nuclear plants . Therefore , the PAA should be amended allow-
ing citizens injured from modern nuclear occurrences to merit 
compensation under the li ability regime specifica ll y designated 
for that type of injury. 
II. B AC KGROUND 
A. OVERVI EW OF THE PRJCE-ANDERSON A CT (PAA): 
l CENTIVIZING ENERGY I NNOVATION 
Nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors are often located 
with in a few hours ' drive of major cities, like Los Angeles 
and New York. 33 The Three Mile Island plant, for example, is 
located near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania with a metropolitan 
area rad ius encompassing over 2 million people.34 Such proxim-
ity raises questions about the safety of the plant and the cost 
resulting from a nuclear accident. Congress enacted the PAA in 
1957 to provide answers to such questions.3s [n 1957, the United 
States wanted to promote the development of nuclear energy to 
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decrease dependence on fossil fue ls. 36 The country was devel-
oping nuclear weapons, aligning with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), and propping up nuclear power plants , 
and while nuclear innovation posed a number of safety risks, it 
was ordered as the first economic alternative to coal.37 Nuclear 
power plants emit fewer radioactive materials into the environ-
ment than a traditional coal-burn ing plant. 38 
Prior to 1957, an obstacle emerged for the deve lopment 
of cleaner energy. To transition from a government control led 
industry to a privately operated fac ility conducting innovative 
energy development an enormous amount of insurance was 
required. 39 insurers were unwilling and unable to provide risk 
coverage to this seem ingly perilous industry whose major prod-
uct possesses a ll the features of uninsurability.4° Consequently, 
Congress passed the PAA as an amendment to the AEA, ensur-
ing substantia l funds are avai lab le to compensate the public in 
the event of an accident.41 
The PAA's success comes from its twofold subsidy on the 
nuclear industry. F irst, it limits the amount of primary insurance 
that nuclear operators must carry- an uncalculated subs idy in 
terms of insurance premiums that they do not have to pay.42 
This distorts e lectricity markets by masking nuclear power's 
unique safety and security risks, and grants nuclear power an 
unfair and undesirable competitive advantage over other energy 
a lternati ves.43 Second, the PAA caps the liability of operators 
in the event of a serious accident or attack, leaving taxpayers 
responsible for most of the damages beyond.44 
In passing the PAA, Congress capped the amount of li ab il-
ity an energy company cou ld face in the event of an accident. 
Through this program, the nuclear energy industry maintains 
$43.2 billion in li abi li ty coverage by the federal government.45 
Thus, the PAA creates exclusive li abi lity for nuclear operators 
for injury arising from a " nuclear incident," and supplies a 
large pool of funds to ensure prompt and fair compensation for 
citizens physically or economically injured.46 In turn , the PAA 
upholds the fra mework for nuclear plant insurance and sets an 
upper limit on industry-wide liabi lity.47 The PAA worked well 
when insurance funds allocated under the Act disbursed approxi-
mately $71 million in claims and litigation costs related to the 
1979 acc ident at Three M ile lsland.48 The Act has proven so suc-
cessfu l that Congress used it as a model for legislation to protect 
the public against potential losses or haim from other hazards.49 
This $ 12.6 billion makes capita l investment in the nuclear 
energy industry more attractive to investors because their risk is 
minimized and fixed. so Thus, the PAA incentivizes investment in 
an area of the energy industry whose development and innova-
tion comes with potentially s ign ificant risks . 
Consequently, the Act is a do ubl e-edged sword for the 
public that it purports to protect. While the legislation has a 
provision to protect the people, it was primarily intended protect 
the industry and bolster investor confidence.s 1 Congress care-
fully crafted the Act to create a federa l nuclear liabi lity regime.s2 
The Act protected nuclear fac ility owners and operators from 
potentially cripp ling charges aris ing from state tort actions.s3 
For example, the Act contains an exc lusive liability regime and 
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a compre he ns ive fin ancia l protecti o n sche me serving the dua l 
purpose of protecting the public and encourag ing nuclear deve l-
opment. 54 Additionall y, Congress drafted the Act to minimize its 
interference w ith state tort law.55 The Act's leg is lat ive hi story 
repeated ly stressed the limited nature of the federal intrusion .56 
On the liab ility front, to fac ilitate prompt and equitab le com-
pensation in the event of a " nuclear incident," the PAA channels 
liability exclusively to the operator, without the need for c la im-
ants to prove fa ult on onl y part of the operator or other entiti es 
at the fac ili ty. 57 A nother limitat ion of the PAA is the definition 
of " nuc lear incident"; the Act defines it broadly as "any occur-
rence . .. w ithin the United States causing . . . bodily injury, 
sickness, o r death, or loss of or damage to prope rty, ar ising out 
of o r resulting from the radi oactive, toxic , o r other hazardous 
properti es of source, spec ia l nuc lea r, o r byproduct materi a l. "58 
The particularity of the words restrict the type of harm the PAA 
prov ides coverage for, and in an era of modern technology and 
advanced nuc lear research , ha rm could be in a lesser or different 
form and not tri gger the Act. 
Despite thi s broad definition of " nu c lear in c ident," not 
every personal injury su it brought against Com mi ssion li cens-
ees triggers the PAA's compensation sche me unless it is an 
extrao rdin a ry nuclear occurrence ("E 0 " ).59 The accident 
ca us in g the harm must be s uffic ientl y severe to classify as an 
ENO. One example where pl a inti ff's claims failed to meet the 
ENO criteria was in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 60 This 
case is s ig nifi cant to current PAA preemption ana lysis because 
it revo lves aro und coverage for a nuclear occurrence being 
within federa l juri sdi ction. 61 The PAA issue in Silkwood was 
w hether the amendment impli ed ly preempted punitive dam-
ages awarded in a s uit not brought purs ua nt to the N uc lear 
Regul atory Commi ssion 's ("N RC") E 0 provisions.62 The 
Co urt fo und that Co ngress prohibited states from regulating 
nuclear safety, but did not prohibit judicial recourse for those 
injured by illegal conduct. 63 Ultimate ly, the PAA exp li c itl y 
draws a roadmap for the procedural nuances assoc iated with 
bring ing a nuc lear claim. 
i. Price-Anderson Act Jurisdictional Elements 
T he Act has two provis ions specifically conferring jurisdic-
tion to federal trial courts. One provides that, when there ha 
been a nuclear incident, "any indemnitor or other interested per-
son" may petition the federa l district court for a determination as 
to whether the liability for the inc ident may exceed the coverage 
mandated by the Act. 64 Purs uan t to this secti on, a federa l di strict 
court mig ht find it necessary to superv ise distribution from the 
indemnity fund .65 The second re levant sect ion of the Price-
A nderson Act provides in pert inent part: 
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(2) With respect to any public li ab ili ty action arising out 
of or resulting from an extraord inary nuclear occurrence, 
the Un ited States di strict court in the district where the 
extraord inary nuclear occurrence takes place . . . sha ll 
have orig ina l juri sd ictio n without regard to the citizen-
s hip of any party or the amount in controversy. Upon 
motion of the defendant or of the Commiss ion , any such 
action pending in any State court or United States district 
court sha ll be removed or transferred to the United States 
district court having venue under this sub-section.66 
The relationship between the PAA and a state tort claim is 
hi erarchical. For example, the Supreme Court relied on the PAA 
as the primary remedy for address ing state tort c laims invo lvi ng 
the nuclear industry.67 C ircuits agree that the legislati ve hi story 
of the PAA indicates that Congress intended that state tort law be 
the basis of sui ts res ulting from nuclear accidents, the Act con-
tains provisions that al ign significant ly with the underlying state 
law even in the absence of an E 0 declaration. 68 By extending 
the PAA's coverage through the 1988 Amendments to the E 0 
criteria, Congress express ly g ranted ri ghts, otherwise unava il-
ab le under state tort law. 69 
J. PRICE-ANDERSON ACT AMENDMENT OF 1966 AND 1988 
Cong ress has continua ll y extended the timeline of the 
PAA's coverage, and it has made s ignifi cant changes to the lan-
guage in the twenty-two years between 1966 and 1988. First, in 
1966, Congress amended the PAA , req uiring those indemnified 
under the Act to waive com mon law defenses, like contribu-
tory negligence, if an action was raised after an "extraordinary 
nuclear occurrence."7° Congress expressed concern that aspects 
of state tort law, like statutes of limitation that were too short to 
a llow actions following radiation exposure, could frustrate the 
PAA's purpose of compensating victims of nuc lea r incidents. 71 
Congress believed th is approac h refl ected the methodology 
fou nd in the orig ina l PAA: " inte rfe ring with State law to the 
minimum exte nt necessary."72 Furthermore, the leg is lative 
hi story for the 1966 Amendments included that "a c la imant 
wo uld have exactly the same rights as today under ex ist ing law, 
including benefit of a rule of strict li ability if app li cable State 
law so provides."73 
Following th e eve nts of T hree Mile Is land in 1979, 
Congress amended the PAA aga in in 1988. This second change 
gran ted U nited Sta tes di stri ct courts o ri g ina l and remova l juri s-
di ct ion over " public li ab ility action" which "aris[es] o ut ofor as 
result from a nuclear inc ident."74 The Act was amended because 
the Three Mile Is land acc ident cou ld not be conso lidated in to 
federa l court s ince it did not reach the level of an "extraordi-
nary nuclear incident."75 Thu s, the 1988 Amendments so lved 
this issue by reducing the " extraord inary" thresho ld at which 
the provisions of the PAA would a pply, making the Act less 
ri g id. Means for ac ti on after the impl eme ntati on of the 1988 
Amendments inc lude " lega l li ab ility ar ising out of or resulting 
from a nuc lear incident," and no longer the requirement to have 
an EN0.76 
2. THE R ELATIONSHIP B ETWEEN THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 
AND THE CONVENTION ON S UPPLEMENTARY COMPENSATION 
The PAA proved successfu l e nough within the United 
States to in form internationa l regulations on nuclear li abili ty. 
The Conve ntion on Supplementary Compensat ion fo r uclear 
Damage (CSC) prov ides a g loba l nuclear liabili ty and compen-
sati on scheme.77 Its regime guarantees timely reimbursement 
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when fac ing particularized injury from international nuc lear 
energy inc idences. 78 In addition to maintaining internationa ll y 
agreed upon terms and defi ni tions, the CSC featu res the creation 
of an international insurance pool to supplement the amo unt 
of compensation ava ilable fo r nuclear damage resulting from 
an inc ident. 79 Mirroring the principles of the United States ' 
PAA, the CSC fun ctions as an internationally respected liab il-
ity standard fo r nuc lear damage adhered to across the g lobe.80 
Therefore, the definition of " nuclear damage" similarl y encom-
passes a broader spectrum of li abi li ty for an incident, accident, 
or lesser occurrence.81 However, unlike the spec ific "nuclear 
incident" definition inc luded in the PAA, the CSC's definition of 
"nuclear damage" includes econom ic loss and impa irment of the 
enviro nment. 82 Di fferences in terminology, such as the example 
of "nuc lea r damage," make it eas ier and more mathemati ca lly 
effic ient to rece ive compensation from a nuc lear accident, which 
is less financially devastating to the energy innovation within the 
nuc lear industry. 
The CSC is significant for hav ing borrowed concepts from 
the PAA in its fo rmulation. However, w ith the advancement 
of nuc lea r technology and the evolution of nuc lear incidences 
occurring at plants in the United States, the PAA should adopt 
the broader defi nition from the internationa l compensation plan 
that it he lped create so that plaintiffs are likely to be compen-
sated by a federal fund intended fo r this type of harm. 
B. TH E CASE WITH THE BILLION D OLLAR P AY Our: 
SUMMARY OF COOK v. R OCKWELL I NTERNATIONAL CORP. 
AND ASSOCIATED CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION 
A childhood in Colorado often consists of many outdoor 
act ivities , such as playing in the mountai ns and swimming in 
the many lakes and streams. Finding out that those streams were 
contaminated with weapon-grade plutonium would be devastat-
ing. This is likely the story fo r anyone li ving outs ide of Denver 
in the 1970s. 
With the increased proli fera tion of nuclear energy, courts 
began see ing I iti gat ion against nuc lear power pl ants in the 
area of neg li gent handling of mater ial. 83 Most notab ly, the 
c la im in Cook v. Rockwell In ternational Corp. stemmed from 
the mishandling of radi oacti ve waste at the nuclear weapons 
fac ili ty located nea r downtown Denver.84 During the Co ld War, 
Dow Chemica l and Rockwe ll Inte rnationa l Corp. operated the 
plant under contracts with the fede ra l government. 85 Adjacent 
property owners c laimed ha rm began in 1989 , when FBI 
agents raided the plant and unea rth ed s igns of environmenta l 
crimes. 86 Ev idence at tri a l impli ed that plant wo rkers di sposed 
of radioactive waste into the grou nd , where the waste leaked 
into bodies of water; and released radioactive part icles into 
the a ir, whi ch then migrated onto the so il around the pl ant. 87 
Unfortunate ly, the plant did not have a spotless environmenta l 
legacy prior to 1989 e ither. For example , the hi sto ry of the 
pl ant inc luded plutonium fires in 1957 and 1969 that wafted 
tox ic smoke over the Denver metropolitan area88 and leaking 
barrels of radioactive waste and other small accidents contami-
nated downstream communities.89 In addition to dimini shed 
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hea lth and safety conditions, the contam ination caused nearby 
residenti a l property va lues to decline, prompting the property 
owners to file a laws uit against the plant operators under both 
the PAA and state nui sance law. 90 
In 2006, a federa l jury conv icted Dow C hem ica l and 
Rockwell Inte rnatio na l Corporation o n charges of negligent 
conduct.91 Two years late r, a Co lorado federa l judge o rdered 
the compani es to pay a total of $926 milli o n in damages , 
in c luding $549 milli on in prejudgment interest due to exten-
s ive pre-trial delays.92 The Tenth Ci rcuit vacated that decision 
in September 20 10, siding w ith the defendants in fi nding that 
plutonium contamination by itself was not adequate ca use 
to seek damages unde r the PAA , whi ch led to the plaintiffs ' 
appea l on state law grounds .93 
ln 20 15, after twenty-fi ve years of a complicated law suit 
involving radiation forensics , nuclear experts, a variety of litiga-
tion tri cks,94 and procedura l reve rsa ls and remands,95 the Tenth 
C ircuit reversed the ho lding aga in in favor of the prope1ty own-
ers. The Tenth C ircuit he ld the c la im originally brought unde r 
the PAA was inva lid , and the case was alternatively a matte r 
of state tort law.96 The pla inti ffs in the case were awarded over 
$900 million plus interest, for a total award upwards of $ 1 bil-
lion.97 Jnstead of us ing money from the fundin g pool designed to 
compensate thi s type of harm, the award came from the nuc lear 
plant's pocket. .98 The plainti ffs took advantage of this misj udg-
ment by abandoning the mecha nisms and benefits provided 
by the PAA and pursuing the background sta te law nuisance 
c la im instead.99 In response, the defendants argued that such an 
action was preempted by the PAA, which the court of appeals 
ultimate ly rejected. 100 Thus, a llowing non-PAA state law claims 
fo r such " lesser occurrences" renders the Act's limitation on 
aggregate li abili ty meaningless. 101 
C. TH E P REEMPTION D OCTR I E AND ITS APPLICATIO TO 
TH E NUCLEAR FIELD 
When state regulations conflict with a federa l law, it triggers 
Article YI of the U.S. Constitution , which dec lares: " [t]he laws 
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof . 
. . sha ll be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every 
state sha ll be bound thereby, anything in the Const itution or 
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. " 102 Thus, 
a federal court may require a state to stop certain behavior it 
be li eves interferes or conflicts with a federal law. 103 This is the 
Supremacy C lause, and it g ives rise to what is known as the 
doctrine of federal preempti on.104 However, application of the 
preempti on doctrine is rare ly stra ightforward . 105 ln fac t, the 
preemption doctrine gets extremely complicated and contro ver-
sia l.1 06 As the Environmenta l Law Reporter notes, "ascerta ining 
the presence of such federal- tate conflicts is large ly a matter 
of statuto ry inte rpretat ion ." 107 When determining whether 
Congress chose to express ly preempt state law, courts look to 
the plain meaning and exp li c it statutory command.108 However, 
when Congress fails to express ly address e ither the presence o r 
scope of preemption w ithin the statute, courts must somehow 
accommodate the tension between the competing constitutional 
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procedures. 109 Courts attempt this by inquiring into the purposes 
of the federal statutory scheme and by delving into the congres-
sional intent behind its enactment. 110 
This implied preemption presents more complicated ques-
tions for courts. Judges must look beyond the language of the 
federal statutes to determine whether Congress has occupied the 
field in which the state is attempting to regulate, or whether the 
enforcement of the state law frustrates the federal purpose. 111 ln 
determining whether to infer a congressional design excluding 
state regulation , courts first examine the language and legislative 
history of the federal statute. 112 Beyond that, they eschew any 
rigid formula and look instead to general criteria. For example, 
general criteria like the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory 
scheme and the need for nationally uniform regulation .113 The 
imprecision of these indicia give courts substantial leeway in 
determining whether implied preemption should be found in 
particular cases. 114 
The next shift in the development of the preemption doctrine 
occurred during the 1940s. Within a six-year period, the Court 
decided Hines v. Davidowitz 11 5 and Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator 
Corp. 11 6 Although both decisions preserved the congressional 
intent requirement for finding preemption, taken together they 
greatly expanded the permissible scope of the Court's inquiry 
into legislative intent. 11 7 The Court in Hines held that preemp-
tion was proper where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress." 11 8 Rice went further, holding that preemp-
tive intent could be inferred from such factors as the pervasive 
nature of the federal scheme or a dominant federal interest in the 
subject area. 11 9 
Subsequently, after 2007 , there was a tendency for 
the Supreme Court to err on the side of broadly interpret-
ing preemption as a means to promote judicial efficiency. 120 
Conforming to the trend , at the Circuit Court level , when 
faced with facts involving state regulations of nuclear facili-
ties , federal regulations prevailed every time. 12 1 The Three 
Mile Island incident in Pennsylvania, for instance, intensified 
national debate over the merits of nuclear power through the 
lens of a preemption scope. 122 To gain control over the future 
of energy and power plants, several states enacted statutes to 
impose restrictions and conditions on the siting of any new 
power reactors within their borders. 123 "While logical , these 
state statutory restrictions ignite a legal dilemma as to which of 
the federal laws governing nuclear development preempt state 
and local regulatory authority." 124 
Several cases illustrate the premise that the federal gov-
ernment sought to reign supreme on nuclear safety issues. For 
example, Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota 125 represents 
a federal case wrestling with the preemptive effect of nuclear 
provisions of the AEA, where the Eighth Circuit found the state 
incapable to impose radiation standards more restrictive than 
criteria defined by the Atomic Energy Commission. 126 The pre-
emption analysis in Northern States was more straightforward 
in comparison to preemption analysis of the nuclear regulations 
on the West Coast. In Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy 
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Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 127 the 
Ca lifornia Warren-Alquist Act required conditions for nuclear 
plant certification was more than an attempt to minimize radia-
tion hazards. 128 Therefore, the court scrutinized the extent offed-
eral preemption of state ability to control nuclear development 
beyond reducing radiation risks. 129 Thus, whether courts apply 
a broad and expansive preemption breakdown regarding states ' 
nuclear regulations, as in Northern States , or a direct language 
argument for preemption as in Pacific Legal Foundations , the 
rulings bode potentially unwell for enacted state laws attempt-
ing to regulate future nuclear energy development. 130 The AEA 
preempts laws regulation radiation hazards. 
In an attempt to clarify the regulatory power of federal 
and state authorities over nuclear development, Congress 
added§ 274 to the AEA in 1959. 13 1 This amendment detailed 
the procedure by which the AEA could transfer its regulatory 
authority over certain types of nuclear material to the states. 132 
The PAA prohibited the Commission, however, from ceding its 
authority over especially hazardous activities and materials. 133 
Additionally, Section (k) of the 1959 amendment expressly pre-
served all state or local regulatory activities designed "for pur-
poses other than protection against radiation hazards." 134 Thus, 
the expressions of congressional intent within the legislative his-
tory of the 1959 amendment demonstrated that Congress likely 
wished to preempt state law to some degree. 135 Building on this 
explicit preemption, in 1988 when Congress enacted the PAA 
amendments, it transformed the "Price-Anderson landscape," 
and resolved the tension between exclusive federal regulation of 
nuclear safety and state law compensation for injuries. 136 
III. ANALYSIS 
To preempt state law causes of action and clarify liability 
under the PAA, Congress should amend the PAA by utilizing 
the negative impacts from Cook. Individuals should be liable for 
lesser "nuclear occurrences" because it will ensure damages are 
paid from the fund and protect the longevity ofnuclear innovation . 
The Tenth Circuit 's misinterpretation of preemption prin-
ciples calls for an amendment to the PAA that stimulates nuclear 
innovation while still heavily compensating the general public. 
The Cook case gave the Tenth Circuit an opportunity to paint the 
modern preemption stroke on an industry in desperate need of 
modernization. ft also gave the Tenth Circuit a chance to clarify 
preemption concerns and affirm the rationale surfacing out of 
its fellow Circuits. The United States' nuclear programs are 
essential to empowering the country. 137 In contrast to the less 
reliable wind and solar energy options, nuclear energy provides 
the United States with a consistent and steady power source. 138 
Despite the advantages to nuclear innovation, hazardous events 
contributed to public fear of the industry.139 However, the acci-
dent at Three Mile Island that created skepticism of nuclear 
energy was two generations ago. 140 Since then, engineers have 
developed designs to avoid such failures. 141 Further, the Three 
Mile Island incident expressly met the criteria outlined in the 
PAA for liability coverage. 142 With the advancement of nuclear 
technology and measures taken to insulate themselves from 
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li ability within the industry, Congress and the regulators are at a 
crossroads with the PAA and the terms and technical definitions 
fro m the l 950's that it encompasses. 143 Based on the confining 
procedural criteria of the PAA, and the way a plai nti ff may only 
ra ise a PAA claim if the technica l benchmarks are satisfied, the 
Tenth Circuit in Cook v. Rockwell int '/ Corp. misinterpreted 
preempti on principles. Yet, in examining the consequences 
of the Tenth Circuit 's rationale in Cook, it is first essenti a l to 
exami ne preemption concern s to understand how the Tenth 
Circuit establi shed the ho lding that directly contradicts that of 
other Circuits- reconci ling bad fac ts and creating consequential 
law. After examining the signifi cant impacts and whether the 
decision was preempted, it is c lear the dec ision precipitates an 
essential amendment to the PAA that will in turn protect nuc lear 
plants from hav ing to pay billions in damages for mere occur-
rences, and further protect nuclea r innovation. 
A. THE T ENTH CIRCU IT D EC ISION IN COOK IS 
SIGNiFICANT FOR CONFLICT! G WITH J UD ICIAL 
P RECEDE T, C ONGRESS IONAL INTENT, AND FOR OPENING 
THE LITI GATION FLOODGATES 
The Cook decision is significant because it contradicts other 
Circuits, unravels congressional intent rega rding the federal law, 
and widens the judicial door by creating the option to circum-
vent the PAA with a nuclear liability claim. The nuclear industry 
in vested in innovation by trusting the PAA's nuclear li ability 
regime.144 The Tenth Circuit 's dec ision jeopardi zes the industry 
by creating new risks, in addition to the dangers associated with 
the acti vity on its face. 145 For example, there is a real probability 
that nuclear owners and operato rs, and thus, government enti-
ti es, could be burdened with signifi cant judgments- perhaps 
upwards of billions of dollars- in favor of plaintiffs who may 
not have suffe red harm that Congress deemed significant enough 
to warrant compensation under the PAA. 146 I f courts rely on 
Cook in cases of alleged harmful occurrences compliance with 
the federal safety standards would not prov ide any protection. 147 
Cities could be subj ect to million s of doll ars in damages, as 
assessed by a lay jury, even though the hazard may constitute an 
undetectable amount, like in the Three Mile Island accident. 148 
While the creation of new risks could be extensive, they are still 
hypothetica l. Concrete application of the dec ision's significance 
begins with its lack of precedent. 
J. COOK R EPRESENTS AN U NPRECEDENTED DECISION 
The Cook court 's decision represents a sp lit with the Fifth 
Circuit and is at odds with the reasoning of other Circuits to hear 
a similar matter. 149 For instance, the Tenth Circuit completely 
disagreed with the ho lding of Cotroneo, and instead fo und sup-
port in the reasoning of the di ssen t in Cotroneo. 150 The Tenth 
Circuit departed from other Circuit dec is ions when choos ing 
between a sui t under PAA or under state tort law. There have 
been numerous nuclea r li ability cla ims tri ggered by narrow ly 
tailored state statutes within the other Circuit. 151 Consistently, 
the court has held that a plainti ff who asserted a PAA claim could 
not pursue a freestanding state-law claim outside the PAA based 
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on the same alleged facts. 152 Si milarl y, the Ninth Circuit 153 has 
re lied on the language of the PAA taking precedence over state 
law in cases that c lose ly para lleled the fac ts of Cook. The N inth 
Circuit consistently held that "[t]he PAA is the exclusive means 
of compensating victims fo r any and a ll c laims arisi ng out of 
nuclear incidents." 154 
ln departing fro m other Circuits, the Tenth C ircuit's deci-
sion wi ll c rea te uncerta inty in th e ap plicati o n of the PAA . 
Appli cat ion ambi g uity wi ll parti cul ar ly impact a number 
of nuclea r industry players that are located within the Tenth 
C ircuit, including Department of E nergy 's ("DOE") Waste 
Iso lation Pilot Pl ant fac ility (the nation's only disposal fac ility 
fo r high-leve l nuc lear waste) , the Sandia Natio nal Laborato ry, 
and the Los A la mos Natio nal Laboratory, a ll of which are 
importan t nati ona l security fac ilities. 155 S impl y by v irtue of 
their phys ica l location, fac ilities in the Tenth C ircuit now face 
uncerta inty about their potential liability expos ure even if a 
nuclear incident never occurs. In addition to be ing an unprec-
edented dec ision and contrad icting other Circuits on analogous 
cases, the Cook decision questions Congress 's intent in deter-
mining what scenarios merit coverage. 
2. THE COOK D ECISION U NRAVELS CONGRESSIONAL I NTEN T 
In Cook, the Tenth C ircuit substituted its views fo r the judg-
ment of Congress. The PAA is an example of a legislative eco-
nomic scheme, in which Congress has sought " to structure and 
accommodate the burdens and benefits of economic li fe." 156 It is 
clear that Congress intended the PAA to provide a safety net of 
private insurance for government indemnification and claims of 
"public li ability" which arise from a " nuclear incident." 157 Thi s is 
clear in part because Congress's amendment to the PAA in 1988 
includes a ll nuclear incidents with federa l jurisdiction and pro-
hibits punitive awards in certain circumstances. 158 Additionally, 
the PAA does not allow recovery for c la ims such as psychiatri c 
damages or emotional distress not connected to physical bodily 
injury.159 Moreover, as the Tenth C ircuit expla ined in another 
context, " the inclusion of certa in remedies and the exclus ion of 
others under the federal scheme would be completely under-
mined" if pl a inti ffs remained "free to obtain remedies unde r 
state law that Congress rejected." 160 The same principle holds 
here: Congress spec ifically delineated the claims that plainti ffs 
may bring related to nuclear harm under the PAA.16 1 Permitting 
plainti ffs to make an overt end-run aro und the federal nuclear 
liabili ty system to bring alternative claims under state law wo uld 
undermine the entire federal scheme. 
Then-Judge Gorsuch , in writing the Cook opinion, di scussed 
Congress 's intent in drafting the PAA. 162 While he justified hi s 
narrow interpretati on of intent by onl y looking at particular areas 
of the language , he neg lected the bigger industry moti va ti on 
that Congress preserved, as shown in the many amendments to 
extend the PAA. 163 In substituting the court of appeals opinio n 
for the intent of Congress, Judge Gorsuch leve rages an angle 
to the preemption analys is fo r strengthening hi s rationale. 164 
Nevertheless, he mi ssed the mark in analyzing the preemptio n 
doctrine, which determined the outcome of hi s dec ision .16 5 The 
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Tenth Circuit claimed that the Supreme Court disfavors preemp-
tion , a nd that the text of the PAA " merely affords a federal forum 
when a nuclear incident is 'assert[ed]' ." 166 However, " [n]othing 
in thi s la ng uage speaks to w hat happens when a nuclear incident 
is alleged but unproven." 167 In addition to explicitly contradict-
ing the intent of Congress and mis interpreting preemption prin-
ciples, Cook also could widen the litigation gate and lower the 
thres hold for bringing a nucl ear liability claim to court. Notably, 
in dec iding that the PAA is not a complete preemption statute, 
the opinion omitted any di scuss ion of several cases that the 
defenda nts reli ed on in support of their pree mption argument. 168 
The statutory terminology and nuclear labe ling in the PAA 
contributed to the preemption misinterpretation .169 In its hold-
ing, the Tenth Circuit designated alleged but unproven " nuclear 
incidents" as " lesser nuclear occurrences" and stated , " it's 
hard to conjure a reason why Congress would a llow plaintiffs 
to recover for a full panoply of injuries in the event of a large 
nuclear incident but insist they get nothing for a lesser nuclear 
occurrence." 170 Likewise, the PAA does not independently 
define " occurrences," " nuclear occurrences," o r " lesser nuclear 
occurrences." 171 There is hi s torical fluctuation on broadening 
and narrow ing technical terms in order to establish preemption 
interpretations. In acknowledging historical preemption con-
cerns presented in nuclear driven cases, the s tandards articulated 
by Hines and Rice, for example, were so broadly phrased that 
congressional intent to preempt could be found in any area of 
comprehensive federal legis latio n.172 
3. COOK OPENS COURT D OORS TO CIRCUMVENT PAA 
Should future courts confronting a state law face-off with 
the PAA choose to follow the reasoning of Cook, many state 
laws a imed at limiting or conditioning nuclear growth will pre-
vail in federal court.173 After Cook, anyone can sue a nuclea r 
power pl a nt without needin g to satisfy th e nuclear inc ident 
requirements o utlined by the PAA. If plaintiffs prove they suf-
fered from a " nuclear incident," they are entitled to relief under 
the PAA, s ubj ect to certain limitations provi s ions built in " to 
ensure that liabilities arising from large nuclear incidents don 't 
shutter the nuclear industry .... " 174 However, if the plaintiffs 
cannot prove a " nuclear incident" under the PAA, but can prove 
some sort of " lesser occurrence" or " lesser state law nuisance," 
they may proceed on their state law claims. 175 Thus, plaintiffs 
can circumvent coverage fanned out by the PAA. There is now 
the like lihood that owners and operators could be individually 
charged with s ign ificant judg ments without a cap- potentially 
in the billions of doll a rs- in favor of litigants who may not 
have suffered harms that Cong ress deemed s ignificant enough to 
warrant compensation under the PAA. 176 Even if plaintiffs were 
unsuccessful , without the framework of the PAA, such cases 
may s it in court for years in protracted, complex , and expensive 
litigation. 177 It is clear that the authority under state tort law 
could lead to a better pay out. 178 In examining the s ignificant 
impacts Cook may have on judicial efficiency and the industry, 
the consequences should stimulate an amendment to the defini-
tion of a " nuclear incident." 179 
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B. TH E PAA SHOULD HAVE PREEMPTED STATE TORT 
L AW rN THE T ENTH CIRCU IT 
The Tenth Ci rcuit 's dec is io n conflicts with every other 
C ircuit that has considered the preempti ve nature of the PAA. 180 
The quest ion for the court hinged on the determination of 
whether the challenged state law is one that the federal law was 
intended to preempt. 
In looking beyond the express language of federal statutes 
to determine whether Congress has occupied the field in which 
the state is attempting to regulate, whether a state law directly 
conflicts with federal law, or whether enforcement of the state 
law might frustrate federal purposes, the Tenth Circuit misstated 
this analysis . If the court looked to the pervasiveness of the 
regulating federal scheme, the federal interest at stake with the 
PAA, and the danger of frustrating federal goals in determining 
whether a challenged state law can stand , the majo rity would 
arrive at a different holding. 
The PAA's liability scheme mirrors the preemption doctrine, 
under which "the preemptive force of a statute is so extraordi-
nary" that no rmal state law c laim s are converted into federal 
c laims for efficient and equitable reso lutions .181 As the Court 
acknowledged in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, the PAA 
is analogous in its preemptive force to another federal legisla-
tive system under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and the Labor Management Relations 
Act. 182 Moreover, the Tenth C ircuit should have applied the 
analysis from Neztsosie to their decision in Cook. 183 The Court 
in Neztsosie observed that the 1988 Amendments provide "clear 
indications of the congressional aims of speed and effic ie ncy" in 
the resolution of claims. 184 Federal legislative systems that create 
exclusive federal causes of action , such as ERJSA and the PAA, 
are more appropriately analogues than the Class Action Fairness 
Act, which the Tenth Circuit cited by analogy in Cook. 185 
Cong ress intended for the federal government to regulate 
the safety aspects of the construction and operation of energy 
facilities and power plants. 186 This rationale is consistent 
with Sixth and Seventh Circuit holdings and their assessment 
of intent. Those C ircuits found that Congress did not wish to 
create a stand-alone federal tort for a public liability action .187 
The analysis provided that the substantive rules for decision in 
such action shall be deri ved from state law, which , despite its 
prior preemption concern, might encompass substantive issues 
like the requisite duty of care and the burden of proof for cau-
sation.1 88 Therefore, the vision was for state law to augment the 
federal regime substa ntivel y, not circumvent it. 
J. THE S UPREME COURT'S R OLE IN THE T ENTH CIRCUIT'S 
PREEMPTION ANALYSIS 
The Tenth C ircuit's reliance on Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee 189 
is incorrect. After examining both the preemption doctrine 
generally and its application in the nuclear fi e ld specificall y, the 
opinion in Silkwood maintain s di sting uishable authority over 
the Cook decision .190 In Silkwood, the Court, voting 5-4, found 
that federa l law did not impliedly preempt a $ 10 million dol-
lar punitive damages award against a nuclear power plant for 
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neg ligently allow ing empl oyee, S ilkwood, to be contaminated 
w ith pluto nium .191 While Silkwood held that Congres had no 
intention, when it amended the AEA of 1954, of forbidding the 
States to provide remedies fo r inj uries fro m radiat ion. Congress 
did wish to protect the nuc lear industry fro m fr ivo lous c laim s 
that lacked sc ientific backing.192 Addi tiona ll y, Silkwood was 
decided in 1984, fo ur yea rs before the 1988 A me ndments to the 
PAA, which established the li ability act ion as the new and so le 
federa l cause of acti on. 193 Thus, the Tenth C ircuit needed to di s-
tinguish Cook fro m Silkwood since Cook posse sed the elements 
for complete preemption. 
The Supreme Court made clea r that federa l law complete ly 
occupies the fie ld of nuclear safety and preempts state act ion in 
thi s area. Therefore, courts be li eved that federa l law simil arl y 
di ctates the du ty a defendant owes to a pla intiff in a publi c 
li a bility action.194 Regarding radi ati on injuries in Silkwood, 
preemption should not be based on grounds "that the Federa l 
Government has so completely occupied the fie ld of safety" that 
state remedies are precluded.195 Instead the Court must deter-
mine if " there is an irreconc il able confli ct between the federa l 
and state standards," or if the impos iti on of sta te standards 
fo r damages interfe res wi th the purpose of the fe deral law. 196 
However, it is unc lear ifthere is a di ffe rence between occupying 
the fi e ld and confli cting between standards in thi s contex t. Thus, 
any li abili ty ac ti on w ith significa nt federa l ingredi ents sati sfy ing 
preemption is consistent w ith the fac ts a ll eged to have occurred 
in Cook at the Rocky Flats Plant. 
Despite the Supreme Court g iv ing w ide lat itude to the states 
to regul ate nuclea r power w ithin the ir bo rde rs and the signifi-
cance of Silkwood, the Cook dec ision es ta bl is hes new parameters 
governing preemption in the energy neld .197 For example, the 
Tenth C ircuit erred when it downplayed its preemption ana lys is 
just beca use the defendants fa il ed to in voke implied preemption 
doctrine and appeared to di sc la im re li ance on it. 198 The Tenth 
C ircui t a lso re li ed on the fac t th at because both companies 
defl ected on conflict preemption princ iples by not address ing 
them, and the poss ibility of using preempti on as an affirm ati ve 
defense, that the defendants fo rfe ited any appli cation of pre-
emption. 199 Regardless, just because the defendants appea red to 
re linquish the argument of preemption as an affirmative defense, 
should not mean that preemption di d not ex ist in thi s case.200 
Unlike in Silkwood, state standards interfere w ith the purpose of 
the PAA in Cook.20 1 Therefore, the Tenth C ircui t's omiss ion of a 
federa l preemption argument is strongest w hen it hinges on the 
fac t that the pla intiffs fail ed to meet the PAA criteri a of be ing a 
nuc lea r inc ident. 202 However, the Tenth C ircuit did not re ly on 
thi s as the ir j usti ficat ion.203 
Even in circumstances outside of the nuclear inc ident arena, 
if any state regul ati on or law confl icts w ith a nationa li zed po li cy 
it may be preempted. In American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi,204 the Supreme Court conside red the constitution-
a lity of a Ca li fo rni a law des igned to help Ca li forn ia Holocaust 
surv ivors co llect on unpa id insura nce c la ims fro m Germa n 
insurance compani es .205 Despite the absence of any c lear state-
ment preempting state laws such as Ca li fo rnia's, the Court fo und 
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that the state law confl icted with nat iona l policy and "st[ood] in 
the way of federa l, diplomatic obj ectives." 206 
Additiona ll y, the Tenth Circui t leveraged pla in meaning to 
omi t preemption considerat ion in Cook. T he narrowly tai lored 
defi ni t ion of a " nuc lear incident" contributed to Judge Gorsuch 's 
misin terpretation of preemption. As di scussed a bove, the scope 
of compensable c la ims under the PAA is c ircumscribed by the 
Act 's definiti on of " nuc lea r inc ident" - i.e. , "any occurre nce . 
.. caus ing . . . bodil y inj ury, s ickness, death, o r loss of or dam-
age to property a ris ing out of or resulting fro m the rad ioactive, 
tox ic , or other haza rdous prope rties of nuc lea r mate ri a l. "207 
As a matter of law and un til the Cook case, the defi ni tion of 
" nuc lea r incident" establ ished the thresho ld for asserting a com-
pensable inj ury fro m a re lease of radi ati on.208 A plain t iff w ho 
cannot demonstrate bodil y inj ury or property damage as defined 
by the PAA cannot meet the prerequi sites fo r a li abili ty acti on, 
and thus cannot mainta in any action for a radi at ion-re lated 
c laim .209 The refore, when the c la im in Cook sati sfi ed w hat the 
Tenth C ircuit deemed as a " lesser nuclear occurrence," the court 
a rgued that p laintiffs fa il ed to meet the PAA c riteria, a nd thus , 
e liminated a preempti on argume nt. 210 The ambiguity in the 
definit ion of the term " lesser nuc lea r occurre nce" is a criti ca l 
problem emerg ing fro m the Cook dec is ion. Given the evolv ing 
nature of the nuc lear industry, the defi nition permi tt ing coverage 
under the PAA is too na rrow and has contribu ted to the removal 
of the PAA authority and the unprecedented damage award.211 
Mov ing fo rward , courts should cons ider the definiti o n of a 
nuclear incident more broadl y whe n looking to apply PAA fund s 
fo r li abili ty coverage. 
T he Tenth C irc uit should have never been able to justi fy 
re li ance on state law fo r thi s matte r. R adi at io n ex posure and 
improper handling of nuc lear waste has the same consequence in 
Colo rado as in Florida o r New York. The Tenth C ircui t's actions 
illustra te one of the reasons fo r federa l preemption: the issue 
is too compl ex to place in the hands of apply ing va ri ed sta te 
law causes of acti on.212 Whethe r o r not courts could use s tate 
law causes of acti on and the ir own standard of ca re to regulate 
nuclear safety through huge moneta ry awards was the unde rl y-
ing po li cy issue addressed by the S upreme Court in Silkwood. 
That was the " te ns ion" the majo ri ty opini on fo und Cong ress 
a llowed w he n it did no t c reate a fede ra l cause of action in 
the statute. The Cook verdict is exactl y the ev il fea red by the 
Silkwood dissenters.213 While the Supreme Court 's ana lys is of 
preemption questions in Silkwood demonstrates a willingness to 
a llow greater state regulati on of the nuc lear energy industry tha n 
that w hich had previous ly been permi ss ible under the Northern 
States dec ision, there is a shi ft at the C ircuit leve l to take back 
the federa l rul e when a nuc lear inc ident is invo lved. As a result, 
Cook obscured both the bas is for its own parti c ular outcome, as 
we ll as the facto rs we ighed by the Court in deciding preemption 
cases in the nuc lear fie ld in general. 
II 
C. D ESTRUCTI VE Co SEQUE CES FOR TH E N UCLEAR 
I N DUSTRY AND J UDI CIAL E FFICIENCY 
Fo r th e past severa l decades , a hi atus on building new 
nuclear-power plants stymi ed the nuc lea r industry.214 The rea-
sons for the ha lt in construc ti o n have inc luded publi c outrage 
over th e T hree Mile is land m e ltd own, increas ing regul a ti on, 
a nd pl a nt o pe rators' need to insure aga in st a multitude of 
ri sks.215 N uc lear energy companies in vested in thi s industry in 
re li ance of the PAA's thoroug h li a bility regime.216 The Tenth 
C irc uit ' s o pini on enables communiti es and peopl e to c ircum-
vent the PAA, with its puniti ve cap, and bring a c laim under 
state to rt law, whi ch could be fata l to the industry. Companies 
a lready heavily in ves ted in the nu c lea r market can do little 
to miti gate thi s new ri sk. A nd compa ni es not yet in vested in 
the U nited Sta tes nuc lear m arket w ill be di sco uraged to par-
ti c ipate , in vest, or furth er expand- a result prec ise ly contrary 
to co ng ress iona l and exec uti ve b ra nch policy and intent. 217 
Additi o na ll y, the Tenth Circ uit 's dec is ion threa tens to destabi-
li ze the g lo ba l marke t fo r nuc lear ene rgy, w hich is an impo rtant 
co mpo ne nt of the U nited S ta tes ' e ne rgy mi x, pa rti cul a rl y in 
lig ht of c limate c ha nge concerns. N ot onl y does the deci s ion 
put pressure o n furth er in vestment in Ameri can nuclea r facili-
ti es , it a lso runs counter to inte rn a ti ona ll y accepted nuc lea r 
li ability standards .218 Compa ni es a re un w illing to parti c ipate 
in the nuc lear marke t in countri es w here operator li ab ili ty and 
minimum cl a im requirements do no t ex ist. 219 For exampl e, 
India has not foll owed the inte rnati o nal nuc lear li ability regu-
la ti o ns because its nuc lea r li abili ty law prov ides , among other 
things , tha t opera tors may have a ri g ht of recourse aga inst sup-
pli e rs fo r nuclear damages.220 
Th e lack of li a bility regul ati o n conflicts with the inte r-
na ti ona l no rm of c hanneling a ll nuc lea r respons ibility to the 
o perator. A nd no t surpri sing ly, the potenti a l fo r nuclea r sup-
plie r li a bili ty in Indi a has had the effect of di scourag ing many 
nuclear suppli e rs fro m engaging in the Indian nuc lear market, 
inhibi t ing tha t m arket 's gro wth .22 1 Consequentl y, the Tenth 
C ircui t's dec is ion to permit certa in state tort c la ims fo r " lesser 
nuc lea r occurrences" could we ll introduce a s imilar market-
d a mpe nin g effect in to th e U nited States tha t India ex peri-
e nced .222 lt unl e ashes pote nti a ll y s ig nifi cant a nd uncertain 
li a bility fro m the constra ints of the fede ral sta tute des igned 
to c urb it, di scourag ing d o mes ti c a nd fo re ig n actors fro m 
pa rti c ipa ting in the market. ln the process , the United S tates 
" could lose cons idera bl e influence over sta ndards governing 
safe ty a nd was te manageme nt" and even a seat at the nuc lea r 
no nproli ferat io n di scussion table.223 The wo rld may be un w ill-
ing to move toward potenti a ll y safer des ig ns. In add iti on to 
stee ring the pri vate sector away fro m nuc lear investment, the 
Cook dec is ion w idens the judicia l door fo r more litigati o n.224 
B ecause of thi s new ly created framework, the s ize of the ver-
di c t, and future inte rpretati o ns of the PAA's preemptive effect 
(o r lack the reof) , legal ana lys is mov ing fo rw ard should di stin-
gui sh Cook, a nd look to redefine the c rite ri a of the PAA in line 
w ith inte rnati ona l compensation co nventi o ns. 
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D. SILVER Lr IN G: JuDICIAL CATASTROPHE STIMULATES 
PAA AMENDMENT 
The Cook decision rep resents a s ignifi cant departure fro m 
ex isting case law, which holds that allegations even potenti a ll y 
fa lling under the PAA preempted a ll s tate law claims based on 
harm a llegedl y caused by exposure to or contaminati on fro m 
radioacti ve material s. 225 One positive aspect is that w hile the 
Tenth Circui t dec ision in Cook is preempted by federal law and 
generates grave consequences fo r the nuclear energy industry, it 
may ultimate ly stimulate an additional amendment to the PAA, 
as a means to regulate coverage of an industry that is rapidly 
moderni z ing. An amendment to the techni ca l definiti ons and 
cri teria w ithin the PAA could ensure that a dec ision like Cook 
does not occur in the fu ture. In amending the PAA,226 Congress 
was we ll aware that the PAA compensation system must operate 
as a consistent part of a larger federal framework governing the 
safe use of nuclear energy.227 Congress knew that "[n]umerous 
federa l questions would necessa rily ari se in the course of litiga-
tion under thi s Act, and questions must be resolved consistently 
with the pervas ive federa l scheme."228 
The definiti on of a " nuc lear incident," as origina ll y pro-
mulgated in the AEA, needs to be updated to confo rm to the 
re lated definiti on of " nuc lea r damage" in the Convention on 
Supplementary Compensation (CSC).229 That way, when there 
is a nuclear incident at a plant, a communi ty may rece ive federal 
funds fo r the harm because the federal li ability will cover even 
a nuclear occurrence, whi ch is less than an inc ident. Further, 
Congress should adopt the report language c larifying that a 
" nuclear inc ident" under the fra mework of the PAA covers any 
re lease of radioacti vity in excess of regulatory limits. Adopting 
a federal inc ident standard as the liability action standard of 
care harmonizes federa l preemption w ith precedent. Ul timate ly, 
Congress should amend the PAA to complete ly preempt state 
law causes of action, but a lso to clarify that public liability under 
the PAA should apply to lesser "nuclear occurrences." Such an 
amendment wo uld close the loophole illustrated in Cook and 
help the PAA better achieve its goa ls .230 Adhering to the tech-
ni ca l criteri a of the CSC w ill strengthen Uni ted States nuclea r 
safety credibili ty domesticall y and internationally. 
The defendant 's duty is to compl y with the federal inc ident 
definiti on standards through whi ch the complete federal preemp-
tion of nuclea r safety is effectuated.23 1 If the defining language 
and compensab le criteri a modifi es in para ll e l fas hion with the 
industry 's innovation, Congress 's scheme to provide coverage to 
the nuclear community will remain intact. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the denia l of cert iora ri , the Tenth C ircuit dec is ion 
expands the scope of liability fo r nuclear power defendan ts in 
PAA cases, where the criteri a fo r PAA coverage is not met, and 
a ll ows pla inti ffs to preva il under state tort law. However, the 
Tenth C ircuit should have fo und pla intiff's c la ims preempted by 
federa l law fo r occupy ing the fi e ld of safety compensation and 
frustrating the federa l purpose. And w hile the decision fos ters an 
array of negative impacts to the nuclear industry, it precipitates 
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the need to address the technica l defin itions and criteria of the 
Price-Anderson Act. Upon amend ing the definiti on of a "nuclear 
inc ident," pursuant to the language in the Conventi on of 
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